Systems for Implementation Review

The development and effectiveness of multilateral agreements depends not only on the international configurations of power and interests but also on how the agreement and its institutions have been designed and developed. Verification systems and SIRs are both examples of the importance of institutional design. Compared with verification, SIRs have received relatively little attention in the fields of arms control and disarmament. At a time when progress on arms control is particularly difficult, it is important to explore how the development or increased use of SIRs could be helpful.

Systems for implementation review are international or regional institutions and mechanisms through which parties share information on implementation, compare implementation activities, review one another’s performance, address noncompliance or poor compliance, and, where useful, adjust their commitments. These systems operate at the international level, but focus on implementation performance at the national level. They include mechanisms for regularly exchanging national reports on progress in implementation; international expert groups that advise on opportunities and challenges related to implementation; fact-finding or problem-solving mechanisms to address emerging problems with national implementation; peer-review processes; arrangements for lesson learning; and feedback mechanisms to facilitate possible adjustments to commitments.

While verification systems focus on detecting noncompliance, SIRs are designed to help parties improve their implementation performance, recognizing that inadequate implementation by some parties may be due to a range of factors, many of which can be addressed through timely mobilization of international attention and assistance. For this reason, SIRs have often been less politically sensitive and easier to negotiate.

Evidence on the Significance of SIRs for International Regime Effectiveness

The significance of SIRs was first identified by research on the effectiveness of international environmental agreements. It was one of the main findings of a major three-year international research project titled “The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. Theory and Practice” (IEC) conducted in 1993–1996 by researchers based at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria.¹ The study, which comprised detailed analysis of a range of case studies, showed that the development and operation of SIRs was an important factor in improving implementation and effectiveness. It also found that weak or absent SIRs were a reliable indicator that an environmental agreement was probably making little difference to practice even if much effort went into its negotiation.

The findings of this IEC research project attracted wide international attention and significantly influenced international negotiations on the further development of, among others, the climate change, stratospheric ozone protection, regional seas, and several biodiversity regimes.² Much diplomatic and technical effort was devoted to further developing SIRs in these regimes over the subsequent decade and beyond, with substantial success.

Well-developed SIRs have made two key contributions to environmental regimes. First, they provided an international operating context containing extensive detailed information directly relevant to assessing progress on national implementation efforts. Second, they facilitated dynamic global networks of national and international technical experts to identify and resolve emerging problems with national implementation. The expert networks operated within diplomatically approved international mechanisms and reported periodically to the Secretariat and states parties on their activities. However, the experts were also able to work together directly and flexibly without constant diplomatic involvement. The Montreal Protocol, climate change regime, Baltic Sea agreements, and CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), for example, created specific incentives for states parties to report problems with national implementation. Such reporting served not only as a first step toward mobilizing assistance, but, in some cases, also opened the possibility of obtaining an exemption from a particularly challenging commitment if the problem could not be resolved with the help of international experts.

In this context, relevant national technical experts and implementing agencies became active participants in the wider international regime. This significantly increased the dynamism of the regime and also created incentives for successful national experts to engage constructively, for example by offering them opportunities for career advancement and access to international funding. In the process, clear evidence emerged that SIRs not only improved national implementation of treaty commitments but also enabled levels of implementation that often went well beyond minimum requirements. Moreover, where SIRs are well developed, it becomes much easier to identify and question any information gaps in national implementation reports, thereby helping to deter noncompliance or misinformation, much like verification systems.

SIRs in Existing Arms Control and Disarmament Regimes

Although explicit awareness and discussion about the significance of SIRs remain relatively limited within the arms control and disarmament community, many multilateral arms control agreements include provisions for national implementation reporting, technical expert groups to advise and support national implementation efforts, peer-review mechanisms, and other types of SIRs. This implies that there is already a basis for further developing SIRs in ways that can help increase the dynamism and effectiveness of existing arms control and disarmament regimes. To illustrate this, the following paragraphs briefly discuss the opportunities and constraints associated with selected existing agreements.

The Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention (BWC)

For many years, disputes relating to Article 5 and the development of a verification system have hindered progress toward strengthening the BWC. It is widely acknowledged that, due to a combination of commercial, technical, and security reasons, negotiating an effective BWC verification system would be complex and difficult. In this context, numerous initiatives have sought to develop useful SIRs, including information exchanges, confidence-building and transparency visits, peer-review mechanisms, a Science and Technology Review Working Group, and an International Agency for Biological Security to support national implementation of BWC commitments.³ If approved, these initiatives would have helped to strengthen the BWC regime. However, they have generally been blocked by a coalition of states, including Russia, which may perceive such SIRs as a threat to their efforts to keep the BWC weak. This case illustrates both the potential for SIRs to enhance the dynamism of the BWC regime and the obstacles to improving regime effectiveness when key parties are determined to block such efforts. Nevertheless, if and when political opportunities arise to approve initiatives within the BWC, significant progress is likely to be achieved most rapidly on SIRs, whereas an acceptable verification regime would take considerably longer to negotiate.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has well-developed systems for both verification and implementation review, supported by the treaty’s Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Over the past decade, the operation of these systems has been constrained and contested by efforts by Syria, Russia, and their allies to obstruct OPCW investigations into the production and use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. However, the tide appears to have turned on this issue, as international evidence-gathering efforts and site visits have increased dramatically since the Assad regime was toppled in 2024.⁴ In the meantime, the dynamism of chemical and biochemical research and development presents state parties with increasingly complex challenges when it comes to effective regulation and control, making SIRs a vital mechanism for maintaining regime effectiveness. In this context, the work of Temporary Working Groups under the Scientific Advisory Board, together with the ongoing development of an Action Plan on National Implementation of CWC commitments, provides an important focus. Multiple SIRs mechanisms and resources will be needed to promote the effectiveness of this Action Plan, some in specialist or emerging areas of concern. We recommend that careful attention is devoted to the design of these systems, enabling them to work in synergy, thereby contributing to improved national performance and the timely identification and response to emerging problems across all states parties.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has a complex structure, in which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has primary responsibility for operating the nuclear safeguards regime, while the NPT Review Conference process provides the main forum for reviewing progress on other key treaty commitments, including peaceful nuclear technology transfer to developing countries and progress toward disarmament by the five nuclear weapons states recognized under the treaty. In response to significant criticism, the IAEA nuclear safeguards regime has been strengthened over the past two decades. Although mainly designed for verification purposes, in practice, the present nuclear safeguards regime already includes a range of reporting, review, and lesson-learning mechanisms that could also be used more purposefully as SIRs. They could provide a basis for global or regional initiatives to reduce underlying vulnerabilities to proliferation—for example, by helping to limit the use of highly enriched uranium in medical or research reactors or further improving the security of nuclear stockpiles. Further, if the five nuclear weapons states were to renew their interest in at least paving the way for nuclear disarmament, they could participate in international SIRs tailored to this purpose, while also implementing confidence-building measures among themselves.

Humanitarian Arms Control

We now turn to “humanitarian” arms control agreements, such as the Ottawa Convention, the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Arms Trade Treaty. This broad category of multilateral agreements has a long history, but expanded particularly rapidly between 1995 and 2015. During this period, opportunities were taken to elaborate on the implications for specific aspects of human insecurity of long-established commitments under International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, including the indiscriminate effects on civilians of use of anti-personnel mines and the high levels of death and injury in many countries and areas associated with inadequately controlled small arms. Systems for implementation review are particularly relevant to the operation of these humanitarian arms control regimes because of the importance of engaging with the wide range of governmental and intergovernmental agencies, officials, and experts directly involved in addressing the complex, context-specific challenges of national implementation of commitments.

The effectiveness of humanitarian arms control agreements typically depends on two factors: (i) the implementation of agreed norms and responsible practices by governments and other agencies, particularly those that have previously been neglectful or lacked the necessary national awareness and regulatory systems; and (ii) the mobilization of international cooperation to support programs of action in areas severely affected by the problems addressed by the agreement. Systems for implementation review have been customized to promote progress on both of these aims. For example, the Ottawa Convention established commitments for states parties, on the one hand, to ban or severely restrict the production, use, and international transfer of anti-personnel mines and, on the other, to mobilize international programs to clear such mines from conflict-affected areas where they pose risks to local populations. The first aim requires SIRs involving national arms-licensing authorities, customs and military authorities, as well as the associated civilian governance and oversight bodies, while the second requires SIRs involving officials and experts from national, regional, and international aid agencies, civil society and mine clearance organizations. Most humanitarian arms control agreements are presently at risk of being marginalized amid global geopolitical tensions, but renewed focus on supporting and developing the SIRs associated with them could mitigate the impact on their effectiveness, particularly in areas of severe need.

The Role of SIRs in Developing International Cooperation on the Uses of Outer Space, Cyber Weapons, and Emerging Technologies of Concern

It is widely recognized that the existing international treaties and institutions governing uses of outer space are inadequate to address the many security and safety issues involved. However, efforts to remedy this by negotiating new multilateral agreements have been hindered. Attention has instead shifted to the more limited aim of developing soft law international codes of conduct or good practice. Although there are some excellent proposals and initiatives in this area, it is proving very challenging to even begin negotiating them in the present international geopolitical climate.

A renewed focus on SIRs could be particularly helpful here. One proven advantage of these systems in other issue areas is that they provide mechanisms through which networks of national and international experts from industry and civil society can translate broad, diplomatically agreed principles into more specific good-practice guidelines. Although these international expert views on what constitutes a useful code of conduct initially lack any legal or diplomatic standing, they can gradually become a key international reference point. Even if some states or national officials refuse to formally recognize or participate in the process, its results can still be robust and influential, provided that the process is sufficiently broad-based and technically competent.

It is important to link such SIRs to diplomatically recognized bodies, such as authorized Technical Working Groups. In the case of outer space, these include the UN Technical Working Group under the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as well as its counterparts under the UN Conference on Disarmament agenda on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and within its Open-Ended Working Groups. Specific research or advisory group initiatives might be launched by informal coalitions of the willing, the findings of which may then be considered by the official multilateral working groups. This approach is obviously no panacea, but nevertheless merits close attention.

For similar reasons, creating carefully tailored SIRs appears to be an important focus of efforts to promote international discussions on codes of conduct or good-practice guidelines for addressing difficult issues, such as cyber weapons and the responsible development and use of “emerging technologies,” such as artificial intelligence (AI).

Policy Recommendations

The German Foreign Ministry and its European Union and international partners should devote greater attention to the development and more purposeful use of SIRs in their efforts to:

• improve the dynamism and effectiveness of existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, including the CWC, BWC, NPT, and humanitarian arms control agreements; and

• develop international codes of conduct and good-practice guidelines as part of their soft law approaches to promoting international cooperation on safety and security issues in outer space, as well as to limiting the risks posed by the use of cyber weapons and misuse of emerging technologies.