Technology Preferences of Six Military Innovator Countries: An Updated Analysis of Security Policy Technology Strategies

This is the third year that we have examined military technology developments in selected countries. As observed in previous years, several overlapping trends appear to be driving the current pace of military-technological innovation. First, artificial intelligence continues to develop apace, with AI increasingly finding its way into a multitude of weapon-system functions, leaving less and less room for the human operator. Second, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has created a highly dynamic field of innovation, particularly in the use of uncrewed systems across all military domains. The development and fielding time of new or at least improved systems, once a process that took months or even years, can now be completed in a matter of weeks. Third, the more general security environment has led to a significant increase in European armament spending, with a focus on state-of-the-art or next generation systems.

However, as we have also argued in previous CNTR Monitors, choices regarding military technology remain complex national decisions shaped by on perceived threats, individual technological capabilities, and the desire to retain an advantage in certain areas. The pursuit of prestige, national ethical attitudes, and specific interpretations of domestic and international law also play vital roles. Countries therefore inevitably differ in their technology priorities as well as their preferences.

This chapter picks up where we left off in 2025, delving deeper into the analysis of the five countries under scrutiny—Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States—while adding a sixth case, Türkiye.¹ In contrast to last year’s Monitor, where we focused on each country’s two most recent national military technology strategy documents, this year we analyzed the most relevant technology papers published over the past decade. This broader time frame allows us to draw conclusions regarding longer-term trends and wider developments.

We examined in particular depth strategies with a technological emphasis that address innovation and research and development in military capabilities. This includes strategies that discuss technologies in singular domains, but excludes those centered exclusively on a single technology, thereby retaining this study’s focus on technological portfolios rather than the operational details of individual technologies. For the same reason, strategies foregrounding organizational and managerial innovation of the defense industry as well as strategy implementation reports were not considered.

The corpus of strategies comprises 46 documents published between 2016 and 2025. The strategies were then analyzed using a coding scheme developed over several years, previous versions of which were also used in the 2025 and 2024 Monitors. The scheme comprises 19 main or top technological categories, and 137 subcategories, where more specific information was available. Parts of the strategies that mention or discuss specific technologies were coded and categorized with these subcategories. The coding was conducted by several coders using MAXQDA 24, and a number of reliability tests were carried out throughout the coding period to ensure intercoder reliability. Moreover, the results for the strategy papers were normalized at the document level to account for differences in length and the total number of codings per paper. The analysis is thus based on relative numbers, with each paper receiving equal weight in the accumulated treatment. Overall, the dataset comprises almost 13,500 coded technology text segments which were analyzed using RStudio.

As in previous years, the following section will first present the results for each of the six countries individually, before adopting a comparative and an aggregated perspective.

Individual Country Summaries

Australia

Given Australia’s self-perception as the “odd man out” in Asia, combined with a pronounced sense of insecurity, the country tends to view its adversaries’ military-technological developments as potential threats. Australia has therefore developed its own robust high-tech industry, leading not only to the establishment of domestic defense companies but also to multiple American and European defense firms setting up Australian branches. Despite its relatively small military, Australia has become a key player in the field of forward-looking military strategy, and the fact that the country is represented with 13 strategy papers clearly demonstrates its long-term commitment to innovation.² The most important issues debated over the last 10 years include the improvement of already existing conventional capabilities (14.7%), artificial intelligence (11.3%), communication technology (10.5%), as well as cyber (9.7%) and sensing technology (9.4%), and (ballistic) missile technology (6.9%). With the exception of missile technology, the long-term view reveals a remarkably consistent focus over time. As explained in last year’s Monitor, the Australian military has to cover, monitor, and secure a vast maritime area. An integrated approach that incorporates new sensors, new and reliable means of communication, and AI-powered analytics helps them to accomplish this task. This also shows that Australia aims not to rely exclusively on allied partners to secure its coastal waters, while its investment in “traditional” military technologies simultaneously makes the country an attractive military partner to others.

United States

The United States is represented in this study with 10 strategy papers that meet the sampling criteria.³ As the country with world’s largest annual military budget, the U.S. has long been a proponent of substantial investment in advanced technologies and related research. While conventional capabilities (15.5%), AI (9.1%), and communication technology (7.9%) are the three most frequently mentioned categories in their papers, energy technology ties for 4th place with sensing (both 7.8%). This broad perspective is also reflected in the additional technologies featured in the analyzed strategy papers: over the project period, the U.S. showed wide-ranging interest in technologies across scientific fields, including biotechnology (5.6%) and space engineering (4.8%). The trend analysis shows that in recent years, we can see a particularly marked increase in their interest in quantum technology, as well as in technologies used in the cyber and space domains, manufacturing, and AI. While U.S. strategies throughout the 2010s tended to focus on specific technologies, the trend now, as in other countries, appears to be toward a more diversified technological focus. Rather than highlighting a single technology as the primary revolutionary or disruptive force, an increasing number of technologies are receiving comparable attention, with smaller differences in their relative prominence across technological categories. This indicates that the U.S. aims to employ a diverse range of technologies in conjunction with one another, rather than focusing on individual platforms for deployment and research and development.

Japan

Japan, which is represented with three strategy papers in the analysis,⁴ is the only one of the six states whose most frequently coded technology category is not conventional capabilities but, accounting for 18.3 percent of all codes, (ballistic) missile technology, which includes missiles and ballistic technologies, as well as missile defense. This alludes to the fact that the country’s priority is the air domain as it prepares for both offensive and defensive maneuvers. With 12.8 percent of all codes, Japan clearly underscores the importance of modern manufacturing and advanced materials as its second strategic defense priority, closely followed by conventional capabilities and protection (12.5%). This makes Japan another outlier in comparison to the other countries whose strategies mention manufacturing and materials far less frequently. This suggests that, while other states communicate their military might through conventional capabilities—including the maritime, land, and air domains—as well as AI and communications, Japan prefers to showcase its capabilities through state-of-the art research, with a particular focus on technologies capable of reaching distant adversarial targets. Based on the relative distribution of the technologies mentioned, it appears that Japan has a tiered system of priorities, with three groups at the top: a) missile technologies; b) advanced manufacturing and conventional capabilities; and c) communication technologies, AI, and unmanned systems.

Germany

Germany’s 2020 and 2024 security and defense strategies⁵ both prioritize conventional capabilities and protection, which together account for 24 percent of all codes. This is followed by cybertechnologies (14.2%), artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare, as well as countermeasures as part of communication capabilities, with the additions in 2024 of quantum and space technologies. Unlike the U.S., Germany focuses on a dedicated set of key national technologies linked to military capability and industrial competitiveness, rather than a broad range of technologies. However, this implicit reliance on external capabilities is acknowledged in the 2024 strategy, as are the risks associated with technological dependencies and supply-chain vulnerabilities. The 2024 strategy paper therefore underlines the need to cooperate with EU and NATO partners, while also calling for greater resilience and technological sovereignty, particularly through a stronger emphasis on software, IT products, and cybersecurity. Overall, Germany’s strategic discourse has evolved from a predominantly industrial perspective toward a broader focus on security, resilience, and digital sovereignty. Although no new strategy has been published since 2024, recent developments—including temporary U.S. export controls affecting AI software and tools, as well as the broader U.S.–China competition over critical technologies—are likely to reinforce Germany’s emphasis on reducing strategic dependencies, diversifying supply chains, and developing sovereign European capabilities in AI, cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, cybersecurity, and other dual-use technologies. This tendency is already reflected in Germany’s support for, and votes in favor of, corresponding measures at the EU level.

Türkiye

For the period analyzed, Türkiye published seven strategy papers.⁶ The Turkish documents are notably extensive and highly detailed, reflecting the country’s strong commitment to innovation across multiple domains. Consistent with the overall results, Türkiye’s most coded technology category, making up one-third, is conventional capabilities and protection with a focus on rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and vehicle systems for land and sea (30.9%). Thereafter, Türkiye likewise refers to different complementary technologies, each making up 9 to 10 percent of the coded technology categories. Notably, of these, unmanned systems and robots feature especially prominently, with a particular focus on uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). This category is followed by sensing and communication technology. In terms of sensing, the main priorities are radar technology and optical sensors, while for communication technology the emphasis is on electronic warfare and electromagnetic technologies. Artificial intelligence, accounting for 7.6 percent of coded categories, further underscores Türkiye’s drive toward more capable and intelligent systems. Together, these priorities reflect a technology agenda spanning the full spectrum from conventional platforms to emerging and enabling technologies.

United Kingdom

In this analysis, the UK is represented with 11 strategy papers.⁷ As in many other European countries, the UK’s perspective on military security has been heavily influenced by the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Before this, the focus had been—again, as in many other European countries—on global crisis intervention and the fight against international terrorism, with Brexit bringing Britain closer to the U.S. and further away from its former EU partners. After 2022, national and alliance defense have once again taken center stage, with a clear focus on resilience and “warfighting readiness,” as the 2025 Strategic Defence Review explicitly stated.⁸ Like other countries, the UK recognizes the need to invest in the latest technologies to keep the military edge. It is therefore no surprise that the focus on improving conventional capabilities by far exceeds all other technology categories (18.2%). In addition, the idea of archiving a transparent battlefield is also reflected in the British debate, with sensing (8.5%) and communication technologies (8.3%) emerging as the next two most important categories. Artificial intelligence, which is discussed not only in terms of its broader application across different systems but also in connection with data science as well as machine and deep learning, is also an issue that plays a key role in the debate (7.3%). This suggests that the UK continues to prioritize AI as a strategic technology for the development of future defense capabilities. As in all other countries, interest in missile technology also ranks highly (7.9%).

The Macro Perspective

Looking at the top-10, top-level categories in each country, a clear picture emerges that is consistent with our 2025 analysis. The most important issue for all the countries analyzed has been the improvement of their already existing conventional capabilities. In addition, improving battlefield communication and command-and-control systems, alongside the use of AI for analysis and enhanced sensing capabilities, has been an important theme for all countries, reflecting the idea, variously termed “network-centric warfare” or one of the “revolutions in military affairs.” What had been merely a military technology vision in the late 1990s and early 2000s is now taking shape. In addition, anything “cyber” has also featured prominently over the last 10 years. What is surprising, however, is the relatively low scoring of uncrewed and autonomous/automated systems, although aggregated numbers do have the tendency to obscure interesting details.

Extending our study period has enabled us to gain a clearer picture of the trends—although, given the relatively small number of strategy papers and their erratic publication cycle, these findings should be interpreted with a degree of caution.

The first interesting observation is that ballistic missiles are rated lower throughout the 10-year observation period than they have been in recent years, although they do show a slight upward trend. The impact of the war against Ukraine is particularly clear here. Although such missiles were certainly discussed as a relevant technology during the 2010s, the much greater interest in them has been driven by Russia’s systematic use of these weapons against Ukraine. These deployments have not only highlighted the need for effective defense but also sparked interest in acquiring such systems oneself—whether for deterrence or to strike high-value military targets.

The trend analysis also captures the heightened interest in the military use of AI, which peaked around 2020 before levelling off, followed by a slight upward trend toward 2025. It will be interesting to see whether AI experiences a further revival in future strategy papers when the use of large language models (LLMs) and (decision) support or battle management systems are expected to feature more prominently.

While, as reported above, uncrewed systems score relatively low, there does seems to be a positive trend with these systems gaining greater prominence due to their relevance in the Russia-Ukraine War. Although uncrewed systems, particularly uncrewed aerial vehicles, proliferated worldwide in the 2010s, most Western and allied militaries had yet to develop concrete strategies for integrating these systems into their military operations. This has shifted markedly in response to feedback from the battlefields in Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s long-range Ukrainian attacks against strategic assets in Russia.

When it comes to cyber systems, we still see a high level of overall relevance, although there has been a slight decline since its peak in 2020. While almost all the countries analyzed see cybertechnology as a highly important capability in their arsenals, it has lost relative importance with the return of traditional battlefield operations and the “hands-on war” as seen in Ukraine. This development could also have been encouraged by the growing perception of cyberthreats as domestic threats and threats to critical infrastructure, thereby entering a hybrid domain that shifts the focus away from purely military operations toward threats posed by both state and non-state actors. Lastly, while we are seeing a steady increase in the significance of human enhancement technologies, their current level of adoption remains low. It is likely that this technology, which so far has been discussed only in niche circles, will become more relevant in the future, particularly as brain–computer interfaces being to enable faster interaction between operators and machines.

One more meta-observation is that modern military technology is debated quite differently in the countries under scrutiny, both in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. Over the 10-year study period, Germany published two(!) technology-related strategy papers, Australia—which is significantly less powerful militarily—published 13, and Türkiye, which is roughly on par with Germany in terms of military budget, published at least seven—all of which were highly detailed documents. Japan, on the other hand, seems to have adopted a similar approach to Germany in terms of output, producing just three papers during the observation period. Of course, it must be taken into account that, in addition to the publicly available papers, other confidential documents are likely to exist—and Germany is certainly no exception in this regard. However, this probably applies to all the countries under study and does not explain the lack of public documents in Germany and Japan.

Yet it is not only the volume of publicly available papers that varies across countries. How they describe their technological ambitions also differs significantly. Some remain on the “buzzword” level (using terms such as quantum technology, AI, etc.), while others describe their investment plans in more detail (referring for example to quantum sensing, radar technology, or command-and-control systems). While in the German case, 62.2 percent of all codes stay on a generic level, this is only true for 32.1 percent of all coded segments in Türkiye and 40 percent in Australia. Interestingly, while Japan has published only a small number of papers, the level of detail they contain is high, with just 33 percent of the codes remaining on the generic level. This reveals markedly different approaches to communicating with the public on military technology ambitions and investment.

Conclusion

When Western countries and allies discuss the future role of cutting-edge technology in their militaries, they do not limit themselves to technologies that are traditionally regarded as “emerging” and “disruptive,” but instead aim for a mixture of familiar and tried-and-tested concepts (albeit in significantly improved form) that are complemented or enhanced by new technologies. This is all the more true in light of the scenes from the battlefields of Ukraine and Gaza, which are being closely followed by the whole world. Although some countries attach greater importance to certain technologies than others, overall we are seeing a convergence toward a common view of the relative importance of individual technologies within the technology mix. At this point, we would also like to reiterate our warning from last year to pay closer attention to the growing interest in ballistic missiles.

When it comes to how countries inform their populations about their technological goals, there is also room for improvement, at least in some countries. While Australia provides its population with very comprehensive and detailed information, the opposite is true in Germany. The German discourse differs markedly from that in all other countries studied. Apparently, the Bundeswehr and the Ministry of Defense are reluctant to subject the public to debates on technology. Given the current security situation, however, this reticence seems outdated and could prove problematic when decisions have to be made regarding the development and procurement of new weapons technologies that have not been adequately communicated. The German public, too, should be informed about future military planning—including in the technical sphere. Greater transparency is needed, and our partners are demonstrating that this is possible without revealing military secrets. We simply must not shy away from open discussion or be afraid of potential criticism.