International Treaties Related to Biological Weapons Disarmament and Nonproliferation

The 1925 Geneva Protocol

The “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” usually referred to as the 1925 Geneva Protocol,¹ prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare between its high contracting parties. As of August 2024, the Geneva Protocol had 146 member states. On signing, many parties declared that they would cease to consider themselves bound by the Protocol vis-à-vis states that did not respect its provisions, thereby de facto reserving the right to retaliate in kind. However, the prohibition of CBW use has evolved into a rule of international customary law, which means it applies universally to all states and in international as well as intrastate conflicts.²

Germany signed the Protocol on June 17, 1925 and ratified it on April 25, 1929. It never attached any reservations when it became a party to the protocol.

Biological Weapons Convention

The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (Biological Weapons Convention, BWC; also: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)³ is an international disarmament treaty and the oldest treaty to prohibit an entire category of weapons.⁴ It was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. As of August 2024, it had 187 states parties. The BWC unequivocally prohibits the development, production, possession, acquisition, retention, and transfer of biological weapons. It also obligates its members to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons materials, to foster international cooperation in the peaceful use of biology and biotechnology, and to implement the treaty provisions through national laws and regulations. Research is not covered by the BWC. This was presumably decided because the inherent dual-use character of much of biology and biotechnology, as well as the close interrelationship with public health issues make it impossible to prohibit or universally restrict specific types of research, as this could also restrict legitimate and useful research activities.⁵

Biological weapons are defined as microbial or other biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” together with the means of delivery for such agents or toxins “for hostile purposes or in armed conflict” (BWC Article I). The prohibition is hence comprehensive and not bound to specific biological agents or types of delivery systems, but rather based on the intent to use an agent for biological weapon purposes (General Purpose Criterion). This means that all new relevant scientific and technological developments are automatically covered by the BWC.

The BWC does not provide for any measures to verify compliance with its provisions. Efforts to add a verification system failed in 2001, and the topic only returned to the official BWC agenda recently. At the 9th BWC Review Conference in 2022, states parties agreed to establish a new Working Group tasked to “identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including legally-binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects, to be submitted to States Parties for consideration and any further action.”⁶ In addition to verification and compliance, the topics covered by the Working Group include: international cooperation and assistance; national implementation; assistance, response and preparedness; organizational, institutional and financial matters; confidence-building and transparency; and scientific and technological (S&T) developments.

New developments in biology and biotechnology have presented both opportunities and challenges for the BWC and for the international efforts to strengthen it. Some advances in these and related scientific disciplines (such as AI) may be used to enhance preparedness or to facilitate verification of compliance with the BWC. However, some materials and technologies might also be misused for illegitimate and hostile purposes or might lower the barriers for the development and acquisition of biological weapons. The negotiators of the BWC already recognized the significance of scientific advances by including the review of relevant S&T developments as a task for the BWC Review Conference in Article XII of the Convention. While this undertaking has never been carried out systematically and collectively on a continuous basis, the BWC Working Group is now mandated to make recommendations to states parties to establish “a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with relevant advice.”⁷ If established, such a mechanism could screen, review, and assess S&T developments and provide guidance to states parties on how to recognize and mitigate potential risks, such as those arising from dual-use research (of concern). It could also help identify ways to harvest the potential benefits of S&T developments for strengthening preparedness for disease outbreaks, regardless of their origin, and the BWC as a whole.

While the BWC itself contains no reference to either bioterrorism or biosafety, biosecurity and health preparedness, these topics have entered the BWC discourse over the past 20 years and are now an integral part of discussions. Not all related definitions and understandings enjoy consensus among BWC members. The discursive shift has, however, put the BWC at the center of a larger set of measures aimed at mitigating biological risks across the full spectrum comprising natural disease outbreaks, unintentional/accidental release of biological agents, deliberate use of biological agents for criminal or terrorist purposes, and the use of biological weapons by states.

Germany signed the BWC on April 10, 1972 and ratified it on April 7, 1983.