Other Instruments Supporting Disarmament and Nonproliferation of Biological and Chemical Weapons

UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism

In 1987, the UN General Assembly authorized the UN Secretary-General, through UNGA Resolution 42/37C,¹ to investigate any case of alleged biological or chemical weapons use which UN members bring to their attention. It thereby established the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Chemical or Biological Weapons Use (UNSGM).² The UNSGM has its legal basis in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and international customary law, and it is the only international mechanism currently available to investigate alleged biological weapons use.

If a UN member requests a UNSGM investigation, and if the UN Secretary-General determines that sufficient evidence is presented to warrant such an investigation, he or she can dispatch a mission team at short notice, drawing on a roster of experts and laboratories nominated by UN member states to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The mandate of such a mission would be to “ascertain the facts of the matter” and establish whether chemical, biological, or toxin weapons had indeed been used. The mechanism is politically independent and placed under the sole authority of the UN Secretary-General; the UN Security Council (UNSC) has no formal role in the investigation.

Germany is a member of the “Group of Friends of the UNSGM” and one of the most active supporters of efforts to strengthen the mechanism.

UN Security Resolution 1540 (2004)

In 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540³ which obligates all UN members to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery to non-state actors, and to report on their implementation of the resolution. The resolution has since been renewed several times, most recently in 2022 for a period of ten years.⁴ Measures to be taken by UN members include the adoption and enforcement of national legislation to prevent non-state actors from developing or acquiring NBC weapons, domestic physical protection measures for relevant NBC materials, and effective border and transfer controls. A dedicated committee, the 1540 Committee, was established to support the implementation of Resolution 1540, including by managing the national reports and facilitating the provision of assistance to UN members in implementing the resolution.

Germany is a member of the “Group of Friends of the UNSGM” and one of the most active supporters of efforts to strengthen the mechanism.⁵

Sanctions and Export Controls

To prevent the proliferation to states or non-state actors of materials, equipment, and technologies that could be used to develop and produce biological or chemical weapons, states can put in place several national and international measures, such as sanctions, as well as national and internationally harmonized export controls.

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,⁶ the UNSC can enact sanctions against actors that pose a threat to international peace and security. The UNSC has repeatedly determined⁷ that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses such a threat. Currently, there is one UNSC sanctions regime in place that also relates to biological weapons: the sanctions regime against North Korea.⁸ Implementation of these sanctions is obligatory for all UN member states. There are also unilateral biological and chemical weapons-related sanctions in place against other states. For example, the USA⁹ has enacted sanctions against Russia,¹⁰ Iran, North Korea, and Syria,¹¹ and the EU¹² has set up a sanctions regime in relation to the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.

Export controls are a crucial measure for implementing the nonproliferation obligations that arise from BWC Article IV and UNSC Resolution 1540. There is no global system of biological weapons-related export controls in place. Rather, the control of relevant transfers is the responsibility of individual states. However, the Australia Group and the EU export control regime for dual-use items are two examples of multilaterally coordinated sets of export control measures.

The Australia Group (AG)¹³ is an informal arrangement in which 42 countries and the EU collaborate on the basis of shared control lists to harmonize their export controls over agents, substances, materials, equipment, and technologies that could be used to manufacture biological or chemical weapons. The AG was founded in 1985 after it became known that Iraq had built its chemical weapons, which it used against Iran in the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, in part with the help of legal chemical exports. Biological weapons-related items were added to the group’s control lists¹⁴ in 1991. They comprise lists for “dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software,” “human and animal pathogens and toxins,” and “plant pathogens.” Membership in the AG is possible in principle for countries who fulfil a set of criteria listed on the AG’s website and is contingent on the unanimous agreement of all current AG members. There has been some controversy around the AG. While its members justify its existence with reference to their nonproliferation obligations under the BWC, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Resolution 1540, other states have criticized the group as being discriminatory and as hampering economic and technological development by restricting legitimate transfers.

The EU set up a control regime for the transfer of dual-use items, which also include biological materials and equipment , in 2021 through Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (last amended in 2023).¹⁵ This regulation explicitly refers to the BWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and UNSC Resolution 1540 and obligates all EU members to enact transfer controls on items that are deemed to have dual use and that are specified in Annex I of the regulation. “Dual use” is defined in Chapter 1, Article 2 of the regulation as meaning “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes, and includes items which can be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery, including all items which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Germany is implementing the sanctions enacted by the UNSC, as well as the sanctions and dual-use export regulations enacted by the EU, as part of its obligations as a member of the UN and the EU. Moreover, Germany is a founding member of the Australia Group. The agency responsible for implementing Germany’s export control policy is the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA).¹⁶