International Treaties and Instruments Related to the Governance of Biological and Chemical Weapons Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Dual-Use Risks

International Treaties

The 1925 Geneva Protocol

The “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”, usually referred to as the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare between its high contracting parties. As of August 2025, the Geneva Protocol had 146 member states. Upon signature, many parties declared that they would cease to consider themselves bound by the Protocol vis-à-vis states that did not respect its provisions, thereby de facto reserving the right to retaliate in kind. However, the prohibition of CBW use has evolved into a rule of international customary law, which means it applies universally to all states in international as well as intra-state conflicts.¹

Germany signed the Protocol on June 17, 1925 and ratified it on April 25, 1929. It never attached any reservations to its membership.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC, BTWC)

The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (Biological Weapons Convention, BWC; also: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC) is an international disarmament treaty and the oldest treaty to prohibit an entire category of weapons.² It was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. As of August 2025, it had 189 states parties. Four states have signed but not ratified the BWC, while four states have neither signed nor ratified it.³ The BWC unequivocally prohibits the development, production, possession, acquisition, retention, and transfer of biological weapons. It also obligates its members to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons materials, to foster international cooperation in the peaceful use of biology and biotechnology, and to implement the treaty provisions through national laws and regulations. Research is not covered by the BWC. This was presumably decided because the inherent dual-use character of much of biology and biotechnology, as well as the close interrelation with public health issues, make it impossible to prohibit or generically restrict specific types of research, as this could also restrict legitimate and useful research activities.⁴

Biological weapons are defined as microbial or other biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” together with the means of delivery for such agents or toxins “for hostile purposes or in armed conflict” (BWC Article I). The prohibition is thus comprehensive and not bound to specific biological agents or types of delivery systems but is based on the intent to use an agent for biological weapon purposes (General Purpose Criterion). This means that all new relevant scientific and technological developments are automatically covered by the BWC.

The BWC does not provide for any measures to verify compliance with its provisions. Efforts to add a verification system failed in 2001, and the topic only returned to the official BWC agenda recently. At the 9th BWC Review Conference in 2022, states parties agreed to establish a Working Group open to all states parties whose mandate requires that they “identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including legally-binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects, to be submitted to States Parties for consideration and any further action”.⁵ In addition to verification and compliance, the topics covered by the Working Group include: international cooperation and assistance; national implementation; assistance, response and preparedness; organizational, institutional and financial matters; confidence-building and transparency; and scientific and technological (S&T) developments. The Working Group is expected to submit its results and recommendations to the next BWC Review Conference in 2027, at the latest.

New developments in biology and biotechnology have provided opportunities and challenges to the BWC and to international efforts to strengthen it. Some advances in these and related scientific disciplines – such as artificial intelligence – may be used to enhance preparedness or to facilitate verification of compliance with the BWC. However, some materials and technologies might also be misused for illegitimate and hostile purposes, or lower the barriers for biological weapons development and acquisition. The negotiators of the BWC already recognized the significance of scientific advances by including the review of relevant S&T developments as a task for the BWC review conference in Article XII of the Convention. While this task has never been carried out systematically and collectively on a continuous basis, the BWC Working Group is now mandated to make recommendations to states parties to establish “a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with relevant advice”.⁶ If established, such a mechanism could screen, review and assess S&T developments and provide guidance to states parties on how to recognize and mitigate potential risks. This might include risks arising from dual-use research (of concern), or may help identify ways to exploit potential benefits for strengthening preparedness for disease outbreaks – regardless of their origin – or even for the BWC as a whole. Negotiations on an S&T advisory mechanism were well-advanced in mid-2025 but are currently stalled due to geopolitical tensions and Russia’s obstructionist policy.

While the BWC itself does not contain any reference to bioterrorism, biosafety, biosecurity, or health preparedness, these topics have entered the BWC discourse over the past 20 years and are now integral topics of discussion. Not all related definitions and understandings enjoy consensus among BWC members. The discursive shift has, however, put the BWC at the center of a larger set of measures aimed at mitigating biological risks, with the spectrum of such risks comprising natural disease outbreaks, unintentional/accidental release of biological agents, deliberate use of biological agents for criminal or terrorist purposes, and the use of biological weapons by states.

Germany signed the BWC on April 10, 1972, and ratified it on April 7, 1983.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction” (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. As of August 2025, it had 193 states parties. Israel has signed but not ratified the CWC, while Egypt, North Korea and South Sudan have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. The CWC contains a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, including their use. It also contains obligations for states parties to prevent chemical weapons proliferation, to foster international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry, to provide assistance in case of a chemical attack, and to implement the treaty provisions nationally. Unlike the BWC, the CWC establishes its own treaty organization, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the Convention.⁷

Chemical weapons are defined in CWC Article I as “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes”, together with munitions and other devices and equipment intended for their dissemination. Toxic chemicals have a number of legitimate applications, which is why the CWC makes the prohibition contingent on the purposes for which they are used (General Purpose Criterion) and defines exceptions for legitimate applications. Purposes not prohibited include applications in industry, agriculture, medicine and pharmacology, as well as protection against chemicals and other applications for defensive purposes. Moreover, the treaty prohibition only applies when the use of the chemical in question depends on its toxic properties (as opposed to, for instance, explosive, incendiary, or corrosive properties). Finally, some chemicals, such as tear gases, may be used for law enforcement and domestic riot control, but not as a method of warfare.

The CWC establishes an elaborate verification system that is implemented by the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat. As part of this system, routine industry inspections are based on three lists (‘Schedules’) that contain chemicals that have been developed or produced as chemical warfare agents or which, due to their toxicity, other properties, or their relevance for the production of chemicals listed on schedules 1 and 2, might “pose a risk to the object and purpose” of the CWC. Besides the level of risk posed by the respective substances, assignment to one of the schedules also depends on how often the chemicals in question are used for commercial purposes. Schedule 1 chemicals, which have been used developed, produced, or used as chemical weapons in the past, have little or no commercial use. Schedule 2 chemicals pose a “significant risk” and are “not produced in large commercial quantities”. Schedule 3 chemicals have also been produced or used as chemical weapons but also have widespread legitimate applications and are hence subject to less stringent controls. States parties are obliged to declare scheduled chemicals as well as specific chemical facilities which are then randomly selected for industry inspections by the OPCW to verify that the chemicals and facilities are used for declared and permitted purposes only. It should be noted that the schedules are used for verification purposes and do not define prohibited substances or chemical weapons. The use of any toxic chemical, listed or not, as a chemical warfare agent is unequivocally prohibited. Chlorine is a case in point: it is not listed on any schedule given its widespread civilian applications, but its use as chemical weapon – e.g. in the Syrian civil war – was as illegal as the use of the nerve agent sarin which is listed on schedule 1.

In addition to the routine inspections, in cases where a state party harbors concrete suspicions of CWC violations by another state party the CWC provides for challenge inspections or investigations of alleged chemical weapons use. Neither mechanism has been invoked to date. Instead, when chemical weapons attacks were reported from Syria starting in 2012, the UN and the OPCW set up various ad hoc mechanisms to investigate the allegations, identify the perpetrators and clarify other concerns about Syria’s compliance with the CWC. As a result, investigation and identification technologies, along with chemical forensics, have become increasingly necessary capacities for the OPCW. In the past, another core task of the OPCW was the verification of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities. However, because destruction of all such stockpiles and facilities was completed in 2023, the OPCW has officially entered the post-destruction era and is now more strongly focused on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

Recognizing the importance of scientific and technological developments in chemistry for the CWC in general, the negotiators of the CWC provided for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), to monitor relevant developments and provide advice to the director-general and member states of the OPCW (CWC Article VIII, 21.h). The SAB comprises 25 members who are independent experts, nominated by states parties from different regions to ensure geographical balance. The SAB meets annually and submits its recommendations to the director-general and to states parties. Past recommendations have included the establishment of temporary working groups on specific topics, such as on biotoxins (2022-2024), or chemical forensics (since 2025). The OPCW has its own laboratory, housed in the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre). The laboratory is not only used to carry out the OPCW’s verification and investigation functions but also to offer opportunities for exchange, training, and capacity-building among scientists. Chemical terrorism is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention, but there is a recognition that the OPCW can play a role in its prevention, including through capacity-building and training in chemical security, and that effective national implementation of the CWC contributes to the prevention of chemical terrorism.⁸ Some developments in chemistry and other disciplines, most prominently AI, afford opportunities to enhance verification and build capacity in chemical safety, security, and defense. However, the same developments may also harbor the potential for misuse that must be recognized, monitored, and mitigated.

Germany signed the CWC on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on August 12, 1994. It currently has a seat on the OPCW Executive Council.

Other Instruments Supporting Biological and Chemical Weapons Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism (UNSGM)

In 1987, the UN General Assembly authorized the UN Secretary-General through UNGA Resolution 42/37C to investigate any case of alleged biological, chemical or toxin weapons use which UN members bring to their attention. It thus established the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Chemical or Biological Weapons Use (UNSGM). The UNSGM has its legal basis in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and is the only international mechanism currently available to investigate the alleged use of biological weapons.⁹ While the UNSGM also covers alleged chemical weapons use, in practice – and given the CWC’s near-universal membership – such cases would very likely be dealt with by the OPCW.

If a UN member requests a UNSGM investigation, and if the UN Secretary General determines that sufficient evidence is presented to warrant such an investigation, he or she can dispatch a mission team on short notice, drawing on a roster of experts and laboratories nominated by UN member states to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The mandate of such a mission would be to “ascertain the facts of the matter” and establish whether chemical, biological or toxin weapons have indeed been used. The mechanism is independent politically and placed solely under the authority of the UN Secretary General. the UN Security Council (UNSC) has no formal role in the investigation.

Germany is a member of the “Group of Friends of the UNSGM” and one of the most active supporters of efforts to strengthen the mechanism.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

In 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1540 which obligates all UN members to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery to non-state actors, as well as to report on their implementation of the resolution. The resolution has since been renewed several times, most recently in 2022, when it was extended for a period of ten years (UNSC Resolution 2663). Measures to be taken by UN members include the adoption and enforcement of national legislation to prevent non-state actors from developing or acquiring NBC weapons, domestic physical protection measures for relevant NBC materials, and effective border and transfer controls. A dedicated committee, the 1540 Committee, was established to support the implementation of Resolution 1540, including by managing the national reports and facilitating the provision of assistance to UN members in implementing the resolution.

Germany has implemented Resolution 1540 and submitted five reports, most recently in 2020.

Sanctions and Export Controls

To prevent the proliferation to states or non-state actors of materials, equipment, or technologies that could be used to develop and produce biological or chemical weapons, states can put in place several national and international measures, such as sanctions, as well as national and internationally harmonized export controls.

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) can enact sanctions against actors posing a threat to international peace and security. The UNSC has repeatedly determined that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons poses such a threat. Currently there is one UNSC sanctions regime in place that also relates to biological and chemical weapons, namely, the sanctions regime against North Korea. Implementation of these sanctions is obligatory for all UN member states. In addition, unilateral biological and chemical weapons-related sanctions are in place against other states as well. For example, the USA Shas enacted sanctions against Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, while the EU has set up a sanctions regime in relation to the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.

Export controls are a crucial measure for implementing the non-proliferation obligations that arise from the BWC, CWC, and UNSC Resolution 1540. The CWC establishes specific trade restrictions for the chemicals listed on the three schedules. Chemicals listed on schedules 1 and 2 may only be transferred to other states parties. For schedule 1 chemicals, the exporting state has to notify the OPCW of each transfer and must declare all transfers of schedule 1 chemicals annually. Schedule 3 chemicals may be transferred to non-state parties. In the latter case, however, end-user certificates are required. There is no global system of biological weapons-related export controls in place. Rather, the control of relevant transfers is the responsibility of individual states. However, the Australia Group and the EU export control regime for dual-use items represent two examples of multilaterally coordinated sets of export control measures.

The Australia Group (AG) is an informal arrangement in which 42 countries and the EU collaborate on the basis of shared control lists to harmonize their export controls over agents, substances, materials, equipment and technologies that could be used to manufacture biological or chemical weapons. The AG was founded in 1985 after it had become known that, with the help of legal chemical exports, Iraq had produced chemical weapons including those used against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Biological weapons-related items were added to the group’s control lists in 1991. They currently comprise lists for “chemical weapons precursors”, “dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology and software”, “dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software”, “human and animal pathogens and toxins”, and “plant pathogens”. Membership in the AG is possible in principle for countries fulfilling a set of criteria listed on the AG’s website, but is contingent on unanimous agreement by all current AG members. There has, however, been some controversy around the AG. While its members justify its existence with reference to their non-proliferation obligations under the BWC, CWC and Resolution 1540, other states have criticized the group of being discriminatory and of hampering economic and technological development by restricting legitimate transfers.

In 2021 the EU set up a control regime for the transfer of dual-use items. Last amended in 2024, regulation (EU) 2021/821 also includes chemical and biological weapons-related items. Additionally, it explicitly refers to the BWC, the CWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 and obligates all EU members to enact transfer controls on items that are deemed to have dual-use and that are specified in Annex I of the regulation. “Dual-use” is defined in chapter 1, article 2 of the regulation as meaning “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes, and includes items which can be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery, including all items which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

As part of its obligations as a member of the UN and the EU, Germany is implementing the sanctions enacted by the UNSC and the sanctions and dual-use export regulations enacted by the EU. Moreover, Germany is a founding member of the Australia Group. The agency responsible for implementing Germany’s export control policy is the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA).

Selected Instruments to Enhance Chemical and Biological Security, Mitigate Dual-use Risks, and Promote Safe, Secure, and Ethical Research in Chemistry and Biology

WHO Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences

The World Health Organization (WHO) published its Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences in 2022. It is a comprehensive and practice-oriented reference document aimed at aiding states in their development of national biorisk management strategies and focusing on biosafety, laboratory biosecurity and the oversight of dual-use research. It provides an assessment of the current situation and offers some guiding values and principles for biorisk governance, as well as concrete tools and mechanisms, tailored to specific types of stakeholders. In its annex, it also offers seven hypothetical scenarios in which elements from the Global Guidance Framework could be applied, as well as three illustrative case studies of research that required risk mitigation and management strategies. The Global Guidance Framework is intended as a supporting resource for states; its implementation is not mandatory.

The Hague Ethical Guidelines

The Hague Ethical Guidelines were developed in 2015 by a group of practitioners from the chemical field to provide elements for codes of conduct and ethical discussions related to the use and application of chemistry in accordance with the CWC. The principles on which the Guidelines are based refer to sustainability, education, awareness and engagement, ethics, safety and security, accountability, oversight and exchange of information. They postulate the responsibility of practitioners in chemistry to ensure that chemistry is used for peaceful purposes, to raise awareness of the topic of chemical weapons and the misuse potential of chemistry, and to emphasize the need to include ethical as well as safety and security considerations when applying chemistry. The Guidelines are not binding, but they have been endorsed by several international chemical associations and serve as widely accepted guiding principles for “good” behavior in chemistry.

Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists

The Tianjin Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists were developed jointly in 2021 by representatives of Tianjin University in China, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security in the USA and the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP) and are intended as a contribution to preventing the misuse of biological sciences, including for weapons purposes, through raising awareness of the dual-use and misuse potential of biological research. They contain principles for the responsible use of biosciences that could be incorporated in national biosecurity regulations and codes of conducts. This initiative goes back to a proposal for a model voluntary code of conduct for biological scientists which was first presented in 2016 by China and Pakistan.¹⁰ At the BWC Review Conference in 2022, China, Pakistan and Brazil as co-sponsor submitted the Tianjin Guidelines to BWC states parties for endorsement.¹¹ While the Guidelines could not be formally endorsed by the Review Conference, they enjoyed very wide support among BWC members.

The Framework for Handing Security-Relevant Research in Germany

In recognition of the basic right to the freedom of research as codified in Article 5 of the German Basic Law (constitution), governance of security-relevant research in Germany follows a bottom-up approach and emphasizes the responsibility of individual researchers and research institutions.

Following publication of controversial so-called gain-of-function experiments with a bird flu virus (H5N1) in 2012, the German Ethics Council as well as the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina developed recommendations on the handling of dual-use research in the life sciences. Both documents emphasized the freedom of research and the need to raise awareness among scientists of potential dual-use risks associated with their work. Whereas the Ethics Council also suggested a top-down regulatory approach which was not implemented, the DFG and Leopoldina focused on the self-governance of science and the responsibility of individual researchers and research institutions in the handling of security-relevant research.

The latter approach is being actively promoted by the DFG and Leopoldina. Among other things, it encourages research institutions to establish local Committees for Ethics of Security-Relevant Research (Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung, KEF) to provide guidance and advice to researchers who have identified potential security risks in their research. Through the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research, established in 2014 to support the implementation of their recommendations, the DFG and Leopoldina also undertake outreach and awareness-raising efforts in the scientific community in Germany.