Innovation at Drone Speed—How the War against Ukraine is Shaping Future Warfare

Drones, or uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), are still dominating the battlefields in Ukraine and have had a significant impact on the way the war is fought. Last year’s update focused on the issue of “swarming” and how to circumvent the problem of electronic warfare, for example by using ultra-thin fiber-optic cables. However, since last year, it has become increasingly clear just how profoundly drones are changing the very nature of warfare. Rather than a continuous front, the contact zone between the Russian invaders and Ukrainian defenders has become a collection of small outposts, each manned by two or three soldiers, as drone attacks have made it too dangerous to concentrate troops in a single location along the front. While artillery remains highly important, it is increasingly being replaced and constrained by drones¹. At the same time, the “killing zone”—the strip of land on either side of the front within which the enemy can strike—has continuously expanded as UAV ranges have increased, driven by advances in battery technology and drone design, including winged quadcopters.² While combat missions are still the most important application, new drone uses have become more relevant, including high-precision ³ and the delivery of supplies to otherwise unreachable frontline outposts.⁴ When it comes to innovation, cycles have shrunk from years to months, and sometimes even weeks,⁵ while superior technology is rapidly replicated by the opposing side. Consequently, Ukraine has upscaled production capacity again this year. Last year we reported an estimated production of 2.2 million drones for 2025, with the actual production being close to four million. For 2026, Ukraine is expected to produce at least seven million units,⁶ with an estimated industrial capacity of ten million.⁷ Cheaper, mass-produced drones have become increasingly important, as drones are being deployed in swarms more frequently than they were last year. Although Iran’s in-house technological developments were long dismissed as laughable, the country has now emerged as one of the leading developers of what are known as “one-way attack drones,” which, in terms of their use, are less like drones and more like cruise missiles (see CNTR Monitor 2024⁸). The best-known of these “drones” is the Shahed 136, which has been used in attacks against both Israel and American forces, but is also being launched in large numbers by Russia against Ukraine. In a short space of time, the U.S. even fielded its own low-cost, mass-producible variant of this class of drone, the FLM-136 Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS), which was first deployed in the war against Iran.

Thus, mass production of drones or drone-like systems is booming. Ukraine even outsourced some production to allied countries such as Germany, where German drone start-ups such as Quantum Systems have teamed up to mass produce drones for Ukraine.⁹ While the German military was already buying small numbers of UAVs and loitering munition in 2025, contracts worth EUR 900 million have since been awarded to Helsing, Stark, and Rheinmetall¹⁰ to deliver 12,000 loitering munitions.¹¹ With a market value of estimated EUR 16 billion, Helsing is the highest valued start-up in European history.

However, the latest developments have also underscored the relevance of communication and electronic warfare. Until February 2026, Elon Musk’s company, Starlink, not only allowed Ukraine to use its communications network—comprising thousands of satellites—but also failed to prevent Russia from using it illegally. When Starlink blocked Russia from the network by introducing a whitelist of authorized users, this significantly disrupted Russia’s ability to conduct offensive operations, throwing the Russian military off balance for days.¹² Today, Russia has partially compensated for the loss of direct satellite communication along the front line, but its ability to conduct precision strikes deep into Ukrainian territory remains limited, while Ukraine successfully uses satellite communication to support long-range drone strikes.

Drone defense has been an important issue since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The days when missiles costing hundreds of thousands euros could be used to shoot down cheap drones are over, and new forms of drone defense are on the rise. For example, instances of drones being attacked and killed by other drones have been reported in the past month, revealing a new development: specialized high-speed electric counter-UAVs, such as the joint Ukrainian–German Strila,¹³ have successfully been used to intercept Shaheds in flight. This development expands the counter-UAV portfolio from classical projectile-based systems, such as Gepard or Skyranger, to laser-based systems (with South Korea being one of the technology leaders here)¹⁴ and counter-UAV interceptors. However, while Shaheds and the like are not controlled by an operator, counter-UAVs usually are, limiting the ability to intercept. However, there are reports that artificial intelligence (AI) may soon take over these tasks, freeing personnel for other activities.¹⁵

Due to drone sightings and drone incidences across Europe, defense against drones has become such an important issue that the European Union (EU) has announced plans for a European “Drone Wall,” legally organized and funded through the “European Drone Defence Initiative” or “Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security,” urging member states to develop and implement an interoperable system for detecting, tracking, and countering drones in European skies¹⁶ as part of the Eastern Flank Watch initiative. Member states will receive financial support to develop drone and counter-drone technology and closer ties with Ukrainian manufacturers are encouraged.¹⁷

The latest and probably most important development, however, concerns ground-based systems. While, owing to technological limitations, neither side used uncrewed ground vehicles (military robots or UGVs) on a regular basis for a long time, Ukraine has made a marked shift in this regard and is now experimenting with new applications and tactics on a broad scale. Ground robots have become sufficiently reliable and modular to be used for autonomous resupply along dangerous routes, the evacuation of wounded soldiers to safety, and as platforms carrying explosives or weapons,¹⁸ with some operators claiming reductions of around 30 percent in human casualties in comparable scenarios.¹⁹ Tests have been conducted to assess the use of ground robots in an infantry-like role, including capturing and holding ground against Russian infantry.²⁰ Uncrewed ground vehicles are expected to gain even more in importance over the next couple of years as technology matures.

In sum, the experience of the war in Ukraine has dramatically accelerated advances in the uncrewed systems sector and these new developments are already having a significant impact on the way war is and will be waged in the future. This is evident in the war against Iran, where both sides are using large numbers of one-way attack drones. It is therefore no surprise that it is not only the major powers that are closely following these developments, and that defense against drones has become one of the top military—and indeed political—priorities throughout Europe. However, states face the challenge that virtually all the systems they are currently procuring or planning are at risk of technological obsolescence due to rapid innovation. The industry claims to be aware of this challenge and has responded by developing systems that can be updated and modified.²¹ How effective this strategy proves to be, however, remains to be seen.